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Abstract
In this article, I describe efforts to manage the capacity of homeless shelter programs in Philadelphia and
assess the impact of those efforts on providers and consumers of homeless services. Most reforms have
focused on reducing the capacity of the shelter system by reducing the average length of stay of persons in
shelter and by providing housing relocation assistance. However, these reforms have been compromised by an
inability to contol the demand for shelter, particularly the rate of new admissions , and by the extent of need
for housing assistance among homeless and near-homeless people in Philadelphia. Alternative methods of
financing shelters are described, as are attempts to create a system of specialty shelter providers. The
contradictions of shelter reform and the need for a more comprehensive homelessness prevention strategy are
discussed.
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In this anicle. I describe efforts to mange the capacity of homeless shelter programs I
in Philadelphia and assess the impact of those efforts on providers and consumers
of homeless services. i\fost reforms have focused on reducing the capacity of the I
shelter system by reducing the average length of stay of persons in shelter and by Ii
providing housing :relocation assistance. However, these efforts have been compromised
by an inability to comrol the demand for shelter, particularly the rate of new admissions. I
and by the extent of need for housing assistance among homeless and near-homeless
people in Philadelphia. Alternative methods of financing shelter are described, as I
are attempts to create a system of specialty shelter providers. The contradictions of
shelter reform and the need for a more comprehensive homelessness preyention i
strategy are discussed. i
The emergence of the homeless shelter system in the 1980s in mall'·
ways paralleled the proliferation of poorhouses in the early nineteenth
century. Both coincided with contractions in "outdoor relief," or cash
assistance to the unemployed and indigent, and both systems were
promoted, in part, as reforms offering "indoor relief" to society's
outcasts. The poorhouse movement was a dismal failure. Despite nu-
merous efforts at reform, it was unsuccessful in fulfilling any of its
ambitious promises of rehabilitating the impoverished. 1 Rather, the
poorhouse served only to institutionalize destitution among the sick,
the old, and the jobless. Does today's shelter svstem face a similar fate?
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I e'xamine here several efforts to reform the shelter system in Phila-
delphia and assess the refOl:ms' impact on both providers and consumers
of homeless services.
A Decade of Growth: The Organization of Homeless
Services in the 1980s
The 1980s witnessed a dramatic expansion in the number of homeless
people and the organizations providing services to them. The U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) reports that
the number of shelters increased by 190 percent nationally between
1984 and 1988 and that the nightly bed capacity grew from 100,000
to 275,000.2 Individual cities report even greater increases; for example,
Philadelphia's shelter system grew by more than 2,000 percent, from
250 beds in 1982 to 5,400 beds in 1988.3
Accompanying this expansion in shelter capacity has been an even
larger increase in expenditures on shelter services. The U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development estimates that shelter spending
increased from $300 million in 1984 to more than $1.5 billion in 1988,
a fivefold increase. Public-sector revenue sources (federal, state, and
local) accounted for 65 percent of those expenditures in 1988 and
private-sector sources for the remaining 35 percent- The average per
diem cost of shelter services rose from $19 in 1984 to $28 in 1988. a
47 percent increase. Thus, the average annual cost of an occupied
shelter bed in 1988 was approximately S10,200. Dividing the estimated
annual expenditures by the average per diem cost, approximateh' 53.6
million nights of shelter were provided to homeless people in 1988.
This tremendous growth in shelter capacity has been interpreted
by some as evidence of the strength of volunteerism in America and
by others as a growing strain on public resources." Nevertheless, it is
the growth in public expenditures that has led manv citv and state
officials to question the efficacv of these efforts and their long-term
viability." These concerns have led to strategies to "manage" the homeless
problem, primarily through changes in shelter policy intended to make
shelters more effective and efficient S\'stems of transitional care.
Reforming the Shelters
iHandating Shelter Provision
The first shelter reform in the 1980s, first applied in the large cities
of the Northeast, was the mandate that shelter be provided to all
persons and families who sought it. These mandates resulted from
consent decrees (New York and Philadelphia), the stated commitment
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of city officials to provide shelter (Boston), or the passage of new city
ordinances (Washington). Homeless advocates, in many cases supported
by shelter providers, scored early victories in the 1980s by obligating
city governments to provide this minimal level of service.
For example, in 1985, the city of Philadelphia signed a consent
decree with an organization of homeless people, the Committee for
Dignity and Fairness for the Homeless, which had protested the re-
strictive policies and insufficient capacity of Philadelphia's shelter system.
The city promised henceforth to provide emergency shelter to all
persons who sought it and agreed not to deny shelter to some persons
who were previously considered "noncompliant," such as intoxicated
persons. Under the consent decree, between 1985 and 1988, Phila-
delphia's shelter capacity greatly expanded, as shown in table l. Ac-
companying this capacity increase was an increase in Philadelphia's
homeless budget from approximately $1 million in 1982 to more than
$30 million by 1988.6
Similar expansions in shelter capacity following shelter provision
mandates in Washington, Boston, and New York would suggest that
mandates were linked to shelter development. However, as the HUD
data indicate, shelter capacity increased in cities across the country,
most of which were under no such mandate. 7
1':evertheless, the shelter system quickly filled a niche in the dete-
riorating system of community support services throughout our nation's
cities. Suspicions have been expressed by some advocates and homeless
people in Philadelphia that welfare officials, aware of this ne\v system
of service provision, began to use the shelters as a secondary welfare
and housing system. In effect, it has been argued that the shelters
were being used as an overflow site for other crowded city agencies,
including 'corrections, mental health, substance abuse, housing, and
Table 1
SHELTER CAPACITY I:\" PHIL-\DELPHI:\, 1982-1988, BY AVERAGE DAILY CE~SL-S
:\:\D A:\:\UAL NC:-'lBER OF SHELTER NIGHTS PROVIDED
Growth from
Average Daily Number of Pre\'ious Years
Fiscal Year Census Shelter Nights (in %)
1982 ........... 251 91,540 0
1983 ........... 429 156,620 71
1984 . . . . . . . . . . . 91 I 333,266 1I2
1985 ........... 1.620 591,242 77
1986 ........... 1,946 710,224· 20
1987 ........... 3,261 1,190,321 67
1988 ........... 4,564 1,670,418 40
SOlJRCE.-City of Philadelphia, Office of Services to the Homeless and Adults.
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child welfare. The mandate of shelter provision provided one of the
few open doors to the growing unmet need for housing and social
services among the inner-city poor.
The basic problem with this reform was that it was initiated with
no guiding purpose and with no incentives to limit shelter growth.
Because officials were, in most cases, grateful to find people willing
to open a shelter, few demands were made on providers of shelter
services. Thus, cities like Philadelphia did not initially develop licensing
or programmatic requirements for shelter providers. Moreover, there
were no disincentives for clients or for welfare officials to use the
shelters, and few incentives existed for moving people out of the
shelters once they were admitted. Only the overcrowded and inhumane
living conditions discouraged the use of the shelters, and, given the
apparently restricted options of some persons, even this was not a
deterrent to their use (some street homeless might disagree). The
shelters, therefore, had the potential to grow with no outer limit,
becoming the gathering place (pejoratively labeled the "dumping
ground") for the growing pool of disabled, unemployed, unhoused,
recently paroled, or addicted persons unserved and underserved by
other public agencies.
Programs to Resettle Families and Individuals in Housing
The first reaction to the growing shelter system and its oppressive
reputation was the demand for affordable housing to replace the shelters.
City officials in some areas also saw housing development or housing
subsidies as their only way out of increasing shelter costs. As an added
incentive, housing placement offered the opportunity for cost shifting
as well as reduced local spending. In some states, shelter is financed
by the county or city, while housing is primarily a state and federal
responsibility.
Like other cities, Philadelphia first attempted to relocate homeless
families to permanent housing by creating special subsidized housing
rehabilitation programs, by setting aside some Section 8 subsidies for
homeless families, and by placing homeless families on a prioritv list
for public housing. Philadelphia eventually expanded these programs
to include transitional housing programs and single room occupancy
housing. The combined effect of these housing programs in Philadelphia
was to create financing or placements for approximately 1,300 homeless
households in 1990, three-quarters of which were homeless families.s
City officials re.port that providing permanent housing not only
housed the homeless but also lowered the probability of readmissions
to shelter. In 1987, more than 50 percent of the families placed in
shelter were former shelter clients, whereas in 1990 less than 10 percent
of the families were former clients.9
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However, there was a fundamental problem with this method of
reducing shelter capacity: it did not address the incidence rate. Nearly
200 new families sought shelter each month in 1990, a rate unaffected
by the availability of new housing programs and the decline in read-
missions. lo Given the reported decline in readmissions, this steady rate
of new cases would imply that there was in fact an increase in the
number of first admissions. Therefore, although providing housing
may have helped the city avoid new shelter development, it did not
affect the incidence rate or allow for reductions in shelter capacity.
Another problem with this approach is that it may have introduced
an incentive for shelter referrals and for people to remain in shelter.
In New York City, a similar plan to reduce family shelters through
preferential placement of homeless families in public housing is said
to have backfired by acting as an'enticement for more families to seek
shelter. II Although the plan initially enabled the city to close some
shelters, the arrival of even more new cases-ostensibly seeking pref-
erential public housing placements-forced New York officials to reopen
the closed shelters. Again, there are suspicions that some social service
agencies encourage marginally housed families to seek shelter because
of the perceived advantage of being on a priority list for public housing.
These programs create other perverse incentives as well, such as
encouraging longer lengths of stay in shelter and reducing the incentive
for some persons to seek other alternatives. For example, to qualifv
for a permanent housing placement from the Philadelphia shelter
system, one must stay in the shelter for 50 consecutive days without
any rules violations. 12 Thus, persons who otherwise would have left
shelter prior to 50 days may now stay with the hope of obtaining
subsidized housing, particularly single persons who have had a high
rate of turnover in the Philadelphia shelter systemYlf a person commits
a rules violation, the 50-day count begins again, committing a person
to an even longer shelter stay.
Finally, the 1,300 subsidized housing units created through these
programs are far too few to address the housing needs of both the
homeless population and those at risk of homelessness. Approximateh'
II ,500 households in Philadelphia became homeless in 1990, including
2,500 families, and the vast majority of those found no subsidized
housing. 14 Even had subsidized housing been made available to every
homeless person, the basic contradiction would remain that without
similar entitlements for the near-homeless, demand for shelter would
continue.
Prevention: Keeping Families in Housing
Recognizing that preventing homelessness would be far more effective
in reducing shelter capacity than just providing housing to persons
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in shelter;'Philadelphia officials have also 'su'pported three programs
toassist:those ;threatenedwith homelessness. In their 1991'budget,
the Philadelphia Office of Services to the Homeless and Adults proposed
to help 2,300 such 'households, through either eviction-prevention
housing assistance or emergency relocation funds, at a combined cost
of nearly $1.3 million. 15 Eviction-prevention housing assistance funds
are targeted ·to households that need short-term cash assistance in
order to avoid homelessness or utility disconnections, and emergency
relocation funds are for households that have lost their housing due
to an emergency such as a fire.
The effect of these programs on the incidence and prevalence of
homelessness is hard to estimate given that it is impossible to know
whether these persons would have become homeless or sought shelter
had these programs not eJOsted. Moreover,.'given the short-term nature
of the assistance, the proportion of these families that would eventually
become homeless despite the assistance they receive is unknown.
Nevertheless, the city expects that these programs will eventually allow
it to downsize some of the family shelters. 16
The most significant problem with this approach to reducing shelter
capacity is the extent of need for housing assistance throughout the
city. For example, Cushing Dolbeare has estimated that 129,000 renter
households in Philadelphia are in need of ·housing assistance. based
on the criterion that a household should spend no more than 30
percent of its income on housing. 17 This is clearly a far larger number
of households than those that became homeless in 1990 (II ,607) and
many more than the 2,300 who will be assisted with emergency funds.
Nevertheless, these 129,000 renters represent the larger population
of housing needy from which the homeless come. Dolbeare has estimated
that the potential cost of closing the "affordability gap" for Philadelphia
renters would be $360 million a year. IS Thus, it is obviously much
cheaper for the city to "micromanage" the housing crisis by running
a $15 million shelter system and a Sl.3 million emergency assistance
fund than it is to develop a more comprehensive subsidy program.
Hmvever, without a broad program, there may be little hope that the
city can reduce its shelter capacity bv offering short-term help to just
2,300 households.
Reducing Length of Stay b} Increasing Requirements on Clients
As a result of the city of Philadelphia's budget crisis in 1989 and 1990,
the Office of Services to the Homeless and Adults lost 58 percent of
its 1988 funding, and daily shelter capacity was cut in half. Therefore;
the city faced reneging on its 1985 consent decree and had to develop
a plan for coping with its smaller shelter system. 19 To do that, the city
renegotiated the consent decree and no longer promised to provide
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shelter to all persons who sought it. Instead, the city insisted that
persons with substance abuse or mental health problems be "in treat-
ment" or on a waiting list for treatment, that shelter residents contribute
15 percent of their income to shelter costs, that shelter residents place
60 percent of their income in a savings account, and that noncompliance
with any of these new requirements would lead to the termination of
one's access to shelter.20 This dramatic shift in policy was intended to
be a disincentive for clients to remain in shelter and to force providers
to become more involved in managing the client population, ultimately
reducing the average length of stay in and daily capacity of the shelter
system.
As a result of these efforts, the number of beds in the Philadelphia
shelter system dropped from a high of 5,400 in 1988 to a low of 2,800
in 1990. When demand for shelter increased in the winter months of
1990, shelter capacity increased to 3,151 beds.21 However, city officials
state that they are handling the same annual caseload with this reduced
capacity, meaning that the average length of stay must have propor-
tionately declined, and the rate of turnover proportionately increased.22
Many factors contributed to this reduction in the average length of
stay. First, in choosing which shelters to eliminate, city officials sought
to protect those providers who had historically been the most cooperative
with the stated service priorities of the shelter system and to cut those
providers who had been the least cooperative.23 Procedurally, the city
simply refused to fill vacancies at those sites identified for closure. In
effect, the pool of remaining providers was a select subset of the
original total and was presumed to be more compliant with the city's
new guidelines.
Second, because the reduced supply of providers greatly lessened
the risk of vacancies (unreimbursed beds), providers were virtually
assured of their same revenue in the past, even if they more closely
scrutinized client compliance and increased terminations of service.
Thus, the remaining providers had more freedom to "manage" their
client population.
Third, because of the new copayment and savings requirement, and
because providers did not have a disincentive for client turnover,
clients faced a far more rigid environment in the shelters. It is probable
that many homeless had reservations about paying what amounted to
"rent" for a shelter bed (via the copayment) and that many did not
trust providers with overseeing their savings. Thus, even clients who
were not discharged for compliance violations may have had greater
incentive to leave the shelters on their own initiative.
Finally, the average length of stay for families was eventuaJly reduced
by the housing placement programs. Although the housing placement
programs described earlier did not reduce the incidence rate of new
families seeking shelter (thereby not initiaJly reducing shelter capacity),
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they served to move families out of shelter sooner than in the past.
This eventual r:eduction in length of stay moderately reduced the
capacity of family shelters from a 1988 capacity of 1,30 I beds to a
capacity of 1,206 beds in 1990.
This "success" in lowering shelter capacity and the average length
of stay, particularly among single adults, did not occur without costs,
however, and requires significant qualification. Although there has
been no systematic attempt to document the effects of these changes,
some negative consequences have become apparent.
The number of unsheltered homeless in Philadelphia has increased.
A survey of Philadelphia's street homeless prior to the massive "phase-
down" effort found an estimated 400 persons on the streets, while the
U.S. Census Bureau counted slightly more than 1,000 by 1990.24
It is also probable that the new requirements on residents may have
reinforced and exacerbated the residential instability of some homeless
persons and may therefore sustain some demand for shelter over time.
This is particularly true for addicted and mentally ill persons who are
obliged to be "in treatment" or, more realistically, on a waiting list for
treatment. During the long wait for treatment, violations of regulations
may be difficult to avoid, thus making it difficult to maintain residence
in a shelter. It is also probable that the restrictions will compel many
people to return to the undesirable'situations from which they 'came
prior to seeking shelter-substandard housing, drugs, or domestic
violence-and thus be at risk for future episodes of homelessness.
Given that this reduced system encourages evictions from shelters
and terminations of service, it may also lead to the violation of clients'
rights by tacitly supporting the capricious behavior of providers. Clients
have limited recourse when discharged for compliance violations and
must plead their case before shelter system managers to gain read-
mittance to the system. Although clients may face dire consequences
as a result of discharge policies, procedures for the determination of
"ineligibility" include no provisions for a client advocate or for an
appeal to a "neutral" third partv. 25
Finally, the new regulations could be criticized for lacking a balance
between requirements of clients and requirements of providers. If
clients are to pay for shelter, then providers should face requirements
other than maintaining order, such as being required to offer housing
placement services. However, fewer than half the shelter providers in
Philadelphia offer on-site social services.26
Although this reform measure seems to have been a success from
an administrative perspective, having reduced capacity and lowered
costs while still providing shelter services, without any systematic eval-
uation of what happened to former shelter clients, any unqualified
declarations of "success" are premature. Indeed, there are compelling
reasons to suspect that these reforms have worsened the residential
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stability of some clients, thereby extending the demand for shelter
services in the future.
Alternative Payment Schemes
In an attempt to reduce shelter costs, Philadelphia developed an ai,
ternative payment scheme for its shelter system. Instead of paying
exclusively on a per diem basis, which was seen as encouraging clients
to move from shelter to shelter and as creating an administrative
burden, the city developed a monthly payment mechanism. The as-
sumption was that, by promising providers clients for whom the shelter
would be reimbursed on a monthly basis, the city would reduce turnover
in the shelters and the risk of vacancies. However, in return, the city
capped the monthly payment at S283,or what was the equivalent of
payment for 21 days of shelter. The city, therefore, anticipated saving
9 days of shelter costs per month per monthly placement while gaining
a simpler administrative system.
Because of the practices of some providers, this system ultimately
worked against both the stability of clients and the planned savings
of the city. When providers received payment for only 21 days per
monthly placement, they had an incentive to discharge persons after
21 days, legitimately or not, and to fill those beds with reimbursable
clients. Given the constant demand for shelter, some providers ap-
parently perceived little risk of creating vacancies by following such
procedures. This "churning" process angered clients and circumvented
the city's cost savings, though it gave providers the benefits of admin-
istrative simplicity. The capped payment system was therefore ter-
minated in 1990, although officials retained the administrative advantage
of billing for some clients on a monthly basis.27
Other payment reforms have also recently been considered in Phil-
adelphia, including facility-based funding. Because several shelter fa-
cilities run at greater than 95 percent occupancy, particularly the large
shelters for single men (capacity more than 100), city officials have
negotiated individual contracts with some providers rather than re-
quiring separate billings for each client. The problem with this system
is that the city loses some accountability from the providers and may
lose some of its client tracking capacity. An advantage is that the city
can focus on developing programs at those shelters and reward program
innovations rather than having simply to reimburse on the basis of
the number of shelter nights provided.
Specialty Shelter Providers
The last reform considered in this article is the development of specialty
shelter providers. In what may be the future of shelter provision,
shelters are increasingly defining themselves in reiation to specific
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client types and designing their services around the particular needs
of those client subgroups. For example, in Philadelphia there are now
mental health shelters and "clean and sober" shelters, both of which
attempt to create a'.'therapeutic community" for homeless people.
Specialty shelters have several obvious advantages over the open
dormitory shelters that serve a more heterogeneous population. By
narrowing the range of persons to be served, they make more intensive
service delivery possible. Specialty shelters are also more likely to provide
a bundle of services on-site, which enables clients to avoid the com-
plexities of finding services on their own. Specialty shelters also have
the potential for serving self-help or support group functions. Finally,
from an administrative perspective, specialty shelters are simply better
at stabilizing the client base, and they are more accessible to the homeless
than traditional forms of treatment for mental illness or substance
abuse.
There are, however, a few potential problems with this approach.
It is doubtful that all or most homeless people can be neatly sorted
into special service groups. Many would undoubtedly be misclassified,
others could be cross-classified, and still others might defy classification.
An ambition of poorhouse reformers was that the poorhouse too could
be improved with greater definition of client subgroups.28 However,
subgroups could not always 'be distinguished by poorhOuse adminis-
trators. Moreover, the overriding motivation for creating these sub-
groups-saving money-was incompatible with the goal of providing
better and more comprehensive services.
It is also unclear whether developing specialty shelters will reduce
shelter capacity. Although the idea is appealing because it combines
the advantages of shelter services with intensive social services, this
approach could further institutionalize the homeless population within
yet another unregulated and underfinanced layer of service provision.
Moreover, the availability of such shelters could act as a further incenti\'e
for public officials to use the shelters as a secondary health and welfare
system.
Whether specialty shelters should replicate the funCtions of existing
public authorities alreadv designated to care for low-income populations
deserves careful consideration. For example, there is a public mental
health system and a substance abuse treatment system that are supposed
to provide services to many of the homeless and near homeless, but
whoseinsufficient capacity and inadequate program design playa role
in promoting residential instability. By replicating those services in
the shelters rather than increasing access and quality in the existing
health care system, officials may be unwittingly adding a third tier to
an already unequal two-tier (private versus public) system of health
care provision, thereby reinforcing some of the underlying causes of
homelessness.
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Therefore, although this reform seems like a humane measure, it
could be interpreted as an unnecessary accommodation to the remediable
problems of other public service delivery systems, as an incentive for
referring more people to the shelters, and as ignoring the contradiction
of trying to reduce shelter capacity and expenditures while increasing
the quality of shelter services.
Conclusion
The shelter system has evolved over the last 10 years with little direction
or coherent purpose. Predictably, as the system has grown to consume
a larger share of public resources, attempts have been made to better
manage this system. However, because shelters had no clear design
from the outset, reformers must confront the contradictions of this
secondary welfare system and answer fundamental questions about
its purpose. Whether the shelter system is to be an emergency or
custodial system ofcare and whether it is to be a temporary or permanent
organizational adaptation to the crisis in the welfare state are perhaps
the most important initial questions to answer before reforms can be
considered.
Given the impetus behind the reforms described in this article, it
seems increasingly clear that cities would like to reduce their shelter
systems, if not ultimately eliminate them. To do so they must reduce
the incidence rate of homelessness and the length of stay of persons
in shelter. It therefore appears that cities would prefer an emergency
system of care that is a temporary adaptation to the crisis in the welfare
state. Assuming that to be the case, some conclusions can be reached
regarding the effectiveness of reform efforts and the need for alternative
approaches.
Attempts to manage the homeless problem that focus solely on the
population that is homeless at any given time appear to be both short-
sighted and bound for failure. I have found that there is significant
turnover in the homeless population, as much as SLX persons per bed
per year in Philadelphia, and other research has shown that shelter
use is just one facet of the broader experience of residential instability
among poor people.~9 Therefore, efforts to reduce shelter capacity
that do not consider the larger population of near homeless will empty
shelter beds only to fill them again by others. Although there is an
immediate need to assist families and individuals who are currently
homeless, shelter capacity can only be reduced by providing assistance
to both those who are currently homeless and those at risk of home-
lessness. Providing housing subsidies and specialized social services
just for homeless people risks creating an incentive to use the shelters
as a secondary welfare and housing system, thereby increasing demand
for shelter. This contradiction provides perhaps the clearest evidence
of the limits of shelter-focused interventions to end homelessness.
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Shelter capacity can be reduced by reducing length of stay, but such
efforts do not affect the incidence rate of homelessness. Moreover,
although requiring homeless people to save money and pay for shelter
may act as a disincentive for long shelter stays, these efforts may simply
reinforce residential instability by pressuring some people back into
the streets or into other tenuous or dangerous living arrangements.
Therefore, a reduction in the length ofstay of persons in shelter ought
not to be a goal in and of itself. Reduced length of stay is successful
only if it will benefit the clients, for example, through reduced residential
instability, which will, in turn, reduce the potential for readmissions
to shelter. There is a potential contradiction in trying to reduce demand
for shelter while pressuring people into marginal or unstable living
arrangements.
Preventive efforts such as emergency assistance and rent subsidies
remain the best hope of reducing shelter demand in the long term.
Indeed, a broad housing subsidy program may have to be considered
to avoid the perverse incentives created by a means test. However,
such a program will be costly and would require more active management
of the supply and pricing of housing than appears possible in the
current political climate. The lack of political will for such an effon
is one of the underlying causes of the housing crisis, and thus remains
a major obstacle in -ameliorating the homeless problem.3o
Finally, the need to improve conditions in the shelters is compeiling
but may detract from the more imponant need to reform the housing,
health care, and welfare systems, which, unaddressed, make sheltering
the homeless necessary in the first place. Specialty shelters, smaller
facilities, and more programs in the shelters are proposals that deserve
some attention for their shon-term potential. However, these efforts
do not represent a viable long-term approach for reducing shelter
demand because they do not address the underlying causes of home-
lessness.
In conclusion, the abilitv of shelters to serve as homeless management
agencies is constrained by the structural causes of the homeless prob-
lem.31 Without renewed commitments from public agencies responsible
for the treatment of mental illness and substance abuse. for reintegrating
recently paroled persons in the community, and for promoting child
welfare, affordable housing, and income maintenance. the shelter system
will remain overburdened and unmanageable. The fate of the shelter
system is therefore tied to the functioning of the social welfare system
and will be more determined by its policies than the policies that
govern the behavior of shelter clients and providers.
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